### 1NC – Framework

#### A. Interp – the AFF must defend a USFG policy that either reduces restrictions on or provides financial incentives for energy production.

#### “Resolved” means the framework for the resolution is to enact a policy.

Words and Phrases 64

(Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is **“to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;”** It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

Encarta 0

(http://encarta.msn.com)

 **“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”**

#### B. Violation— the AFF does not defend the literal USFG implementation of a policy

#### C. Reasons to prefer—

#### 1) Competition – without a stable resolutional advocacy, the AFF can sever all links and moot pre-round prep; competitive equity is valuable and necessary for self-growth. We must have a basis to challenge the AFF and engage in struggle.

Yovel 5

[Jonathan, Faculty of Law at University of Haifa in Israel, “Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence,” *Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half-Written Laws*, 2005, rehosted at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950742>] // myost

While reactive forces respond to their context and in this way are dictated by them, active forces find their own mediums for action. There is a catch, however. **Force needs resistance in order to matter, grow, and be challenged.** In a paragraph whose importance to the understanding of Nietzsche’s “mechanics” of power can hardly be exaggerated, he spells it out**: [S]trong nature . . . needs objects of resistance;** hence it looks for what resists . . . . The strength of those who attack can be measured in a way by the opposition they require: every growth is indicated by the search for a mighty opponent . . . . **The task is not simply to master what happens to resist, but what requires us to stake all our strength, suppleness, and fighting skill**—opponents that are our equals.41 Thus the will is measured in the scope of its challenges**. But the active will is not satisfied by those challenges it happens to come by. For the challenge to be worthwhile it must be the most powerful possible,** and so the Person of Power must cultivate the will to power of those who are not**. In debate, the Person of Power will make the best of her opponent’s position, nourish it, then go after the strong points or strongest version or interpretation.** Kasparov must play Karpov, then Deep Blue. The philosophical problems most worthy of engagement—and Nietzsche spoke of problems as something a philosopher challenges to single combat—are the toughest ones. Of himself, he asserts “I only attack causes which are victorious . . . . I have never taken a step publicly that did not compromise me: that is my criterion of doing right.”42

#### 2) Creation – creativity is only possible within a system of rules. We cannot speak from nowhere, so we must locate ourselves within morality in order to grow or create.

Ramaekers 1

[Stefan, assistant professor at the Laboratory for Education and Society at KU Leuven in Belgium, “Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35.2 (2001): 255-264] // myost

Much as one values Nietzsche for his cultural criticism and for his culturally innovative ideas, it would be a mistake to overlook the importance he attaches to obedience. Johnston argues that one cannot infer an anarchistic account of education from Nietzsche's writings because of his emphasis on obedience and discipline in the primary school.2 However, Johnston fails to give obedience its rightful place. For Nietzsche's account of morality (particularly in Beyond Good and Evil, and more specifically in the chapter `The Natural History of Morals') shows that **obedience is not just about keeping pupils in line, but means obedience to cultural and historical rules,** and as such is a moral imperative for all of humankind. The most important thing about every system of morals for Nietzsche is that it is `a long constraint', a `tyranny of arbitrary laws'.**3 For such cultural and historical phenomena as virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality, philosophy, politics and so on the creative act requires not absolute freedom or spontaneous unconstrained development but subordination to what is or at least appears to be `arbitrary'**. It entails a long bondage of the spirit. The singular fact remains . . . that **everything of the nature of freedom**, elegance, boldness, dance, and masterly certainty, which exists or has existed**, whether it be in thought itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading**, in art just as in conduct, **has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law**; and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is `nature' and `natural'—and not laisser-aller!4 The nature of morality inspires us to stay far from an excessive freedom and cultivates the need for restricted horizons. This narrowing of perspective is for Nietzsche a condition of life and growth.5 It is interesting to see how this is prefigured in Nietzsche's second Unfashionable Observation (On the Utility and Liability of History for Life). The cure for what he there calls `the historical sickness',6 i.e. an excess of history which attacks the shaping power of life and no longer understands how to utilise the past as a powerful source of nourishment, is (among others) the ahistorical: `the art and power to be able to forget and to enclose oneself in a limited horizon'.7 Human beings cannot live without a belief in something lasting and eternal.8 **Subordination to the rules of a system of morality should not be understood as a deplorable restriction of an individual's possibilities and creative freedom; on the contrary, it is the necessary determination and limitation of the conditions under which anything can be conceived as possible.** **Only from within a particular and arbitrary framework can freedom itself be interpreted as freedom**. In other words, Nietzsche points to the necessity of being embedded in a particular cultural and historical frame. The pervasiveness of this embeddedness can be shown in at least four aspects of Nietzsche's writings. First, in his critique of morality Nietzsche realises all too well that it is impossible to criticise a system of morals from outside, as a view from nowhere. Instead a particular concretisation is required. Beyond Good and Evil may very well, as a prelude to a philosophy of the future, excite dreams about unlooked-for horizons and unknown possibilities. In The Genealogy of Morals, however, written by Nietzsche as further elaboration and elucidation of the same themes, he explicitly states that Beyond Good and Evil does not imply going beyond good and bad.9 Criticising a system of morals inevitably means judging from a particular point of view.

#### 3) Education – we must learn to lie within systems of rules. This is necessary to function in society, where we have to work with others and obey the rules. This evidence is gender modified.

Ramaekers 1

[Stefan, assistant professor at the Laboratory for Education and Society at KU Leuven in Belgium, “Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35.2 (2001): 255-264] // myost

In view of the importance Nietzsche attaches to obedience, to being embedded, one should not be surprised that he considers initiating the child into a particular constellation of arbitrary laws to be a natural part of her education. For the child, education means, at least in the early stages, being subordinated to a particular view of what is worth living for, and being introduced into a system of beliefs. Education consists in teaching the child to see and to value particular things, to handle a perspective: to lie. The argument goes even further. In view of Nietzsche's **perspectivism one must now say that not initiating the child into a perspective, not teaching him [or her] to lie is educationally speaking not even an option: the child makes him [or her]self familiar with a perspective he cannot ignore since this is the precondition for making sense of anything and exploring the unfamiliar.** Put differently**, because of the necessity of being embedded a human being is moulded into a particular shape that he [or she] cannot do without.** My understanding of Nietzsche is consequently at variance with any understanding which argues for a radical individualism and takes the individual to be the point of reference of all values and truths. Johnston35 for example tilts the scales too strongly towards the individual as a self-affirming autonomous agent and hence disregards the epistemologically and ethically constitutive importance of the individual's embeddedness for what she affirms as true and valuable. He even claims that the individual put forward by Nietzsche is the antithesis of the social realm. For Nietzsche, Johnston writes, `there is no question of a reconciliation between the realms of the individual and the social'.36 Referring to Dewey, he makes it look as if the Nietzschean individual can withdraw herself from social embeddednes since she apparently has no need to refer her own action to that of others.37 Adopting a thoroughly Nietzschean stand on education therefore requires, in Johnston's opinion, a break with education conceived as a matter of `making familiar with' and of being initiated into a particular cultural inheritance, that is as a matter of socialisation in this rich sense. In consequence education becomes essentially self-education. It is not hard to see that focusing in this manner on the individual is greatly welcomed by progressive educational movements such as child-centred pedagogies. In their critique of the traditional educational model, characterised simply as a bestowal of values by the educator, they show their concern with the child's personal identity. In this view initiating the child into a particular view of life does injustice to her personal identity, her true self is suppressed, suffocated and not given the opportunity to develop into what it `really' is**. Education should by contrast create room for the self-development of the child's true self:** this seems to be the educational lesson to be learned from Rousseau, Rogers, Steiner and Freinet among others. An emphasis on a particular kind of experiential learning, supported by a distinctive conception of the nature of experience, warrants the child giving meaning to her own life.

#### D. This is a voter for competition and education. We should fashion the rules of debate to make ourselves more excellent individuals.

Yovel 5

[Jonathan, Faculty of Law at University of Haifa in Israel, “Gay Science as Law: An Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence,” *Nietzsche and Legal Theory: Half-Written Laws*, 2005, rehosted at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950742>] // myost

**In society, the law that best serves the Person of Power is that which empowers the other to best prepare him for such “war”.**43 **Law must elevate the other’s own powers to the fullest of their potential** (the overman, of course, has no presupposed potential: a potential for her would be power-constraining rather than a horizon for development). The Person of Power will not rely on social norms to serve her in overcoming or in dominating: that is the way of ressentiment. Instead she will form law that will make the best out of that which she must stand up to, namely the others. Nietzsche is no closet-liberal: **the principle of law as empowerment of the other is strictly a mean for the will to become more, for the power to will**.44 Law does not empower the other as a subject, although through empowerment the other might discover her own power and so much the better. The other—**the person enslaved by the psychology of ressentiment, be he called slave or master—needs not be empowered to become less contemptible, yet it is because of his contemptibility that he must be elevated.** Empowerment of the other is the active will’s maxim in the exact sense in which the elevated will categorizes natural phenomenon and shapes cognition and language—namely, creating the environment for the best possibilities for the will to cast itself in the world, both natural and social.

## Sexist Language PIC

#### Counterplan: We advocate the entirety of the 1AC except for the sexist language.

#### Stoekl is a sexist and therefore should be rejected

Imray 2007 (Kathryn [Murdoch U]; Review of Allan Stoekl, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Post sustainability; THE BIBLE AND CRITICAL THEORY, VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1, 2009 MONASH UNIVERSITY EPRESS kdf)

Stoekl seems to write of the three religions of the book – Christianity, Islam, and Judaism – as well as other religions (such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism), through use of the umbrella term ‘religion’. Closer inspection however reveals the Christocentric nature of Stoekl’s analysis. For Bataille, and thus for Stoekl, all religions seem to be concerned with personal salvation through sacrifice, and one is not surprised by the repeated references to Jesus on the cross. The few times Stoekl incorporates Judaism or Islam he does so only to contribute his discussion of Christianity. Both progressive and fundamental Christianity are given voice in ‘The atheological text’, but the only Muslim mentioned is ‘a leading modern exponent of … fundamental Muslim law’, and this is only to comment on how ‘Christian tradition neglected the law of the everyday world’ (p. 163). We also learn that it is the advent of Judaism which is responsible for the destruction of the environment (pp. 151, 167). Stoekl clearly enjoys his subject. His ideas are original, and his writing sometimes poetic. It is unfortunate then that he chooses to employ such curiously gendered and jarring language as, ‘The idea that Nature [sic] is dead is over because fossil fuels were not made by Man [sic], they were only extracted by “him”’ (p. xi). Nature here is capitalised and gendered following Sade (p. 11), though this is not consistent. We are left to wonder at the masculine universal until p. 74, where we are told (in endnote 14, p. 219), ‘“Man” is used here in conformity with Kojève’s usage; Kojève does not write of or mention women in his work. Man in a Kojèvian, posthumanist sense is the highest manifestation of the human, prior to the death of Man in Man’s own accomplishment. Throughout the book I will use “Man” in the same humanist sense …’ The use of the universal masculine has long been critiqued by feminist scholars, and one must ask whether Stoekl’s choice is justifiable. Stoekl’s approach sprawls like suburbs around the sacred city, and there is much more in this book than can be mentioned in this review. Stoekl covers topics such as the death of God, counter-religion and the counter-book, mysticism and the unwritable nature of the religious experience, the shift from the Aztec city to our own over – tarmaced cities, and the soul-deep misery of suburbanites. Bataille’s Peak therefore is an important resource for Bataille scholars, but will also interest theologians. Whatever the faults in Bataille’s theories – and there are many – Stoekl has managed to show how he might still be relevant in our modern world.

### Cap K

#### Bataille’s deployment of the general economy is postmodern capitalism at its finest – a valorization of the very figures responsible for the social reproduction of capital

Zizek 2008 (Slavoj; In Defense of Lost Causes; p 373-4; kdf)

Today, this key role of consumption has reasserted itself in an unexpected way. Referring to Georges Bataille's notion of the "general economy" of sovereign expenditure, which he opposes to the "restrained economy" of capitalism's endless profiteering, the German post-humanist philosopher Peter Sloterdijk provides the outlines of capitalism's split from itself, its immanent self-overcoming: capitalism culminates when it creates out of itself its own most radical —and the only fruitful — opposite, totally different from what the classical Left, caught in its miserabilism, was able to dream about." His positive mention of Andrew Carnegie shows the way: the sovereign self-negating gesture of the endless accumulation of wealth is to spend this wealth on things beyond price, and outside market circulation: the public good, the arts and sciences, health, and so on. This concluding "sovereign" gesture enables the capitalist to break out of the vicious cycle of endless expanded reproduction, of gaining money in order to earn more money. When he donates his accumulated wealth to the public good, the capitalist self-negates himself as the mere personification of capital and its reproductive circulation: his life acquires meaning. It is no longer just expanded reproduction as an autotelic goal. Furthermore, the capitalist thus accomplishes the shift from eros to thynwd, from the perverted "erotic" logic of accumulation to public recognition and reputation. What this amounts to is nothing less than elevating figures such as Soros or Gates to personifications of the inherent self-negation of the capitalist process itself: their work of charity — their immense donations to public welfare — is not just a personal idiosyncrasy. Whether sincere or hypocritical, it is the logical concluding point of capitalist circulation, necessary from the strictly economic standpoint, since it allows the capitalist system to postpone its crisis. It reestablishes balance — a kind of redistribution of wealth to the truly needy—without falling into a fatal trap: the destructive logic of resentment and enforced statist redistribution of wealth which can only end in generalized misery. It also avoids, one might add, the other mode of reestablishing a kind of balance and asserting ***thymod*** through sovereign expenditure, namely wars . . . This paradox signals a sad predicament of ours: contemporary capitalism cannot reproduce itself on its own. It needs extra-economic charity to sustain the cycle of social reproduction.

#### The counterhegemonic stance of the affirmative is the justification of capitalism- Voting affirmative isn’t ethical but fashionable, their approach to difference is nothing more than a marketing ploy that will be sucked up by authoritarians

Frank 97 (Thomas; Commodify your dissent; Chapter 1; kdf)

Capitalism is changing, obviously and drastically. From the moneyed pages of the Wall Street Journal to TV commercials for airlines and photocopiers we hear every day about the new order's globe-spanning, cyber-accumulating ways. But our notion about what's wrong with American life and how the figures responsible are to be confronted haven't changed much in thirty years. Call it, for convenience, the "countercultural idea." It holds that the paramount ailment of our society is conformity, a malady that has variously been described as over-organization, bureaucracy, homogeneity, hierarchy, logocentrism, technocracy, the Combine, the Apollonian. We all know what it is and what it does. It transforms humanity into "organization man," into "the man in the gray flannel suit." It is "Moloch whose mind is pure machinery," the "incomprehensible prison" that consumes "brains and imagination." It is artifice, starched shirts, tailfins, carefully mowed lawns, and always, always, the consciousness of impending nuclear destruction. It is a stiff, militaristic order that seeks to suppress instinct, to forbid sex and pleasure, to deny basic human impulses and individuality, to enforce through a rigid uniformity a meaningless plastic consumerism. As this half of the countercultural idea originated during the 1950s, it is appropriate that the evils of conformity are most conveniently summarized with images of 1950s suburban correctness. You know, that land of sedate music, sexual repression, deference to authority, Red Scares, and smiling white people standing politely in line to go to church. Constantly appearing as a symbol of arch-backwardness in advertising and movies, it is an image we find easy to evoke. The ways in which this system are to be resisted are equally well understood and agreed-upon. The Establishment demands homogeneity; we revolt by embracing diverse, individual lifestyles. It demands self-denial and rigid adherence to convention; we revolt through immediate gratification, instinct uninhibited, and liberation of the libido and the appetites. Few have put it more bluntly than Jerry Rubin did in 1970: "Amerika says: Don't! The yippies say: Do It!" The countercultural idea is hostile to any law and every establishment. "Whenever we see a rule, we must break it," Rubin continued. "Only by breaking rules do we discover who we are." Above all rebellion consists of a sort of Nietzschean antinomianism, an automatic questioning of rules, a rejection of whatever social prescriptions we've happened to inherit. Just Do It is the whole of the law. The patron saints of the countercultural idea are, of course, the Beats, whose frenzied style and merry alienation still maintain a powerful grip on the American imagination. Even forty years after the publication of On the Road, the works of Kerouac, Ginsberg, and Burroughs remain the sine qua non of dissidence, the model for aspiring poets, rock stars, or indeed anyone who feels vaguely artistic or alienated. That frenzied sensibility of pure experience, life on the edge, immediate gratification, and total freedom from moral restraint, which the Beats first propounded back in those heady days when suddenly everyone could have their own TV and powerful V-8, has stuck with us through all the intervening years and become something of a permanent American style. Go to any poetry reading and you can see a string of junior Kerouacs go through the routine, upsetting cultural hierarchies by pushing themselves to the limit, straining for that gorgeous moment of original vice when Allen Ginsberg first read "Howl" in 1955 and the patriarchs of our fantasies recoiled in shock. The Gap may have since claimed Ginsberg and USA Today may run feature stories about the brilliance of the beloved Kerouac, but the rebel race continues today regardless, with ever-heightening shit-references calculated to scare Jesse Helms, talk about sex and smack that is supposed to bring the electricity of real life, and ever-more determined defiance of the repressive rules and mores of the American 1950s--rules and mores that by now we know only from movies. But one hardly has to go to a poetry reading to see the countercultural idea acted out. Its frenzied ecstasies have long since become an official aesthetic of consumer society, a monotheme of mass as well as adversarial culture. Turn on the TV and there it is instantly: the unending drama of consumer unbound and in search of an ever-heightened good time, the inescapable rock `n' roll soundtrack, dreadlocks and ponytails bounding into Taco Bells, a drunken, swinging-camera epiphany of tennis shoes, outlaw soda pops, and mind-bending dandruff shampoos. Corporate America, it turns out, no longer speaks in the voice of oppressive order that it did when Ginsberg moaned in 1956 that Time magazine was always telling me about responsibility. Businessmen are serious. Movie producers are serious. Everybody's serious but me. Nobody wants you to think they're serious today, least of all Time Warner. On the contrary: the Culture Trust is now our leader in the Ginsbergian search for kicks upon kicks. Corporate America is not an oppressor but a sponsor of fun, provider of lifestyle accoutrements, facilitator of carnival, our slang-speaking partner in the quest for that ever-more apocalyptic orgasm. The countercultural idea has become capitalist orthodoxy, its hunger for transgression upon transgression now perfectly suited to an economic-cultural regime that runs on ever-faster cyclings of the new; its taste for self-fulfillment and its intolerance for the confines of tradition now permitting vast latitude in consuming practices and lifestyle experimentation. Consumerism is no longer about "conformity" but about "difference." Advertising teaches us not in the ways of puritanical self-denial (a bizarre notion on the face of it), but in orgiastic, never-ending self-fulfillment. It counsels not rigid adherence to the tastes of the herd but vigilant and constantly updated individualism. We consume not to fit in, but to prove, on the surface at least, that we are rock `n' roll rebels, each one of us as rule-breaking and hierarchy-defying as our heroes of the 60s, who now pitch cars, shoes, and beer. This imperative of endless difference is today the genius at the heart of American capitalism, an eternal fleeing from "sameness" that satiates our thirst for the New with such achievements of civilization as the infinite brands of identical cola, the myriad colors and irrepressible variety of the cigarette rack at 7-Eleven. As existential rebellion has become a more or less official style of Information Age capitalism, so has the countercultural notion of a static, repressive Establishment grown hopelessly obsolete. However the basic impulses of the countercultural idea may have disturbed a nation lost in Cold War darkness, they are today in fundamental agreement with the basic tenets of Information Age business theory. So close are they, in fact, that it has become difficult to understand the countercultural idea as anything more than the self-justifying ideology of the new bourgeoisie that has arisen since the 1960s, the cultural means by which this group has proven itself ever so much better skilled than its slow-moving, security-minded forebears at adapting to the accelerated, always-changing consumerism of today. The anointed cultural opponents of capitalism are now capitalism's ideologues.

#### Capitalism’s naturalization of the process of subjugation creates social exclusion on a global scale – the ultimate ethico-political responsibility is to challenge the foundations of this system’s organization principles. This makes reaching the Universal impossible.

Zizek & Daly 4(Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek, 14-6)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gord¬ian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties con¬cerning 'multiculturalist' etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called 'radically incorrect' in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions' and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety.

For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor¬bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary

This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose 'universalism' fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral marketplace.

Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded 'life-chances' cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameess (viz. the patronizing reference to the 'developing world'). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par¬ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek's universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a 'glitch' in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### **Voting negative to sacrifice the affirmative is the only way to test the affirmative’s philosophy and avoid the turns**

King Keenan 5 (Dennis; The Question of Sacrifice; p 58; kdf)

The fact that sacrifice, for Bataille, is an obsessive sacrifice of sacrifice that opens sacrifice to others and separates it violently from itself serves also to correct Zizek’s reading of Bataille. In the Indivisible Remainder (1996), Zizek argues that Batille’s “subject” is not yet the pure void (the transcendental point of the double, self-relating negativity of the subject can express itself only in an “irrational,” excessive, non-economical expenditure that interrupts the balanced circular movement of nature. According to Zizek, what Bataille fails to take into consideration is that the subject no longer needs “real” material sacrifice, since its very existence already entails the most radical double, self-relating sacrifice; that is, it already entails the sacrifice of the very core of its being (IR 124-125). I would argue, however, that Bataille’s work is not fundamentally governed by a need for a “real,” material sacrifice. Sacrifice, according to Derrida’s reading of Bataille, is subject to a “mutation of meaning” on which its meaning slides from the traditional interpretation of the word toward non-meaning. Sacrifice, according to Blanchot’s reading of Bataille, would likewise be misread if it did not glide continuously from the traditional interpretation to “the infinite exigency it exposes itself to in wat opens it to the others and seperates it violently from itself” (CI30/UC15). The infinite exigency that sacrifice exposes itself to is (I have argued) the obsessively self-reflective sacrifice of itself. Both Derrida’s and Blanchot’s readings of Bataille move continuously (I have argued) to a self-reflective sacrafice of sacrifice. Blanchot quotes the follwinging passages from Bataille’s Theory of Religion (1973): “To sacrifice is not to kill but to relinquish and to give” (TdR 310/ToR 48-9; see Ci30/UC 15). To sacrifice, according to Blanchot’s reading of this passage, is “to give oneself wholly to limitless abandonment” (CI 30/UC 15). With this possible allusion to the work of Levinas, one can detect here a sacrifice of the very core of one’s being that is not unlike the “sacrifice of the sacrifice” described by Zizek. Bataille’s obsession with sacrifice is incessantly at risk of being misread unless it is read within the horizon of an obsessional sacrifice of sacrifice. This question of sacrifice is a response to the question of death.

### Case

#### Their sacrificial ethic ignores the fact that capitalism has already constituted the subject in a violent relation to the other- voting affirmative guarantees Nazism

Zizek 96 (Slavoj; The Indivisible Remainder; p. 124-5; kdf)

This notion of the modern, Cartesian subject qua the radical negativity of the double (self-relating) sacrifice also enables us to demarcate the paradoxical place of the theories of Georges Bataille, that is, of Bataille’s fascination with the ‘real’, material sacrifice, with the different forms of holocaust and of the excessive destruction of (economic, social, etc.) reality.41 On the one hand, of course, Bataille’s topic is modern subjectivity, the radical negativity implied in the position of the pure transcendental subject. On the other hand, Bataille’s universe remains the pre-Newtonian universe of balanced circular movement, or — to put it in a different way — his notion of subjectivity is definitely pre-Kantian: Bataille’s ‘subject’ is not yet the pure void (the transcendental point of self-relating negativity), but remains an inner-worldly, positive force. Within these co-ordinates, the negativity which characterizes the modern subject can express itself only in the guise of a violent destruction which throws the entire circuit of nature off the rails. It is as if, in a kind of unique short circuit, Bataille projects the negativity of the modern subject backwards, into the ‘closed premodern Aristotelian universe of balanced circular movement, within which this negativity can materialize itself only as an “irrational” excessive, non-economical expenditure. In short, what Bataille fails to take notice of is that the modern (Cartesian) subject no longer needs to sacrifice goat’s intestines, his children, and so on, since his very existence already entails the most radical (redoubled, self relating) sacrifice, the sacrifice of the very kernel of his being. Incidentally, this failure of Bataille also throws a new light on the sacrificial violence, the obsession with the ultimate twilight of the universe, at work in Nazism: in it, we also encounter the reinscription of the radical negativity characteristic of the modern subject into the closed ‘pagan’ universe in which the stability of the social order is guaranteed by some kind of repeated sacrificial gesture— what we encounter in the libidinal economy of Nazism is the modern subjectivity perceived from the standpoint of the pre-modern ‘pagan’ universe.

#### Their dismissal of modern technology and science is grounded in a form of nihilistic anti-nihilism, such views give way to the truly destructive force of capitalism—this evidence is gender modified

Badiou 99 (Alain [Prof @ University of Paris 8], Manifesto for Philosophy, trans by Norman Madarasz, SUNY, p 53-8, kdf)

**We shall not accept that the word 'technology'**—even **were we to resonate the Greek tekhne within it**—**is apt to designate the essence of our time, nor that there be any relation useful to thought between ‘technology's planetary reign' and 'nihilism'**. **The meditations, calculations and diatribes about technology, widespread though they are, are nonetheless uniformly ridiculous. And we must loudly proclaim what many refined Heideggerians think in private: Heidegger's texts on this point do not in any way avoid this pomposity**. The "timber trail", the clear-eyed peasant, the Earth's devastation, the rooting in a natural site, the blossoming of the rose, all this pathos, from Alfred de Vigny ("on this steel bull that smokes and bellows, man has mounted too soon"') to our 'publicists', by way of Georges Duhamel and Giono, are spun only from reactionary nostalgia. The stereotyped nature of these ruminations, a matter of what Marx called "feudal socialism", is moreover the best proof of their meager conceivable sense. **If I had to give my opinion on technology, whose relation to the contemporary demands of philosophy is fairly scant, it would much rather be to regret that it is still so mediocre**, so timid. So many useful instruments do not exist or only exist in heavy and inconvenient forms! So many major adventures get nowhere or are of the 'life-is-too-slow' type. Just look at planetary exploration, energy through thermonuclear fusion, flying machines for everyone, three-dimensional images... **We must indeed say: 'Gentlemen Technicians, one more effort if you are truly working towards the planetary reign of technology!' Not enough technology, technology that is still very rudimentary—that is the real situation: the reign of Capital bridles and simplifies technology whose 'virtualities' are infinite.** Besides, **it is completely inappropriate to present science as belonging to the same register in terms of thought as technology**. There is certainly a relation of necessity between science and technology but it does not imply any community of interests. **The statements displaying 'modern science' as the effect, indeed the main effect of technology's reign, are untenable**. If, for example, we consider a very great theorem from modern mathematics, the one that demonstrates the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis (Paul Cohen, 1963), we find within it a concentration of thought, an inventive beauty, a surprise of the concept, a risky rupture, in a nutshell, an intellectual aesthetic that we can, if we so choose, compare to the greatest poems of our century, to the politico-military audacity of a revolutionary stratagem, or to the most intense emotions of an amorous encounter, but certainly not to an electric coffee grinder or a color television, as useful and ingenious as these objects may be. Science, qua science, that is, grasped in its truth procedure is, moreover, profoundly useless, save that it avers thought as such in an unconditioned way. There is no turning back on the statement made by the Greeks (the uselessness of science, except as a pure exercise and generic condition of thought), even under the fallacious pretext that Greek society was a slave-society. **The dogma of utility always amounts to excusing the fact that one does not really want—what is called willing—uselessness for all. As for 'nihilism', we shall acknowledge that our epoch bears witness to it precisely in the way that by nihilism we understand the rupture of the traditional figure of the bond, un-binding as a form of being of all that pretends to be of the bond.' Our time indubitably sustains itself with a kind of generalized atomism because no symbolic sanction of the bond is capable of resisting the abstract potency of Capital.** That everything that is bound up proves that in terms of being it is unbound: that the reign of the multiple is the unfathomable depths of what is presented without exception; that the One is but the result of transitory operations—there lies the inescapable effect of the universal placing of the terms of our situation within the circulating movement of the general monetary equivalent. Just as what presents itself always has a temporal substance, and that time is literally counted for us, so **nothing exists which is intrinsically bound to something else, since each of the terms of this supposed essential binding are projected indifferently onto the neutral surface of computation.** There is absolutely nothing to review of the description given of this state of things one hundred and forty-eight years ago by Marx: **"The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal bonds that unite [hu]mans to [their] 'natural superiors', and has left remaining no other bonds between man and man than naked self-interest**, callous 'cash payment'. **It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation."'** What Marx brings to the fore is especially the end of the sacred figures of the bond, the lapsing of the symbolic guarantee granted to the bond by productive and monetary stagnation. **Capital is the general dissolvent of sacralizing representations, which postulate the existence of intrinsic and essential relations** **(between man and nature, men,** groups and the Polls, mortal and eternal life, **etc.).** **It is altogether typical that the denunciation of 'technological nihilism' is always correlated to the nostalgia of such relations. The disappearance of the sacred is a recurrent theme with Heidegger himself, and the prediction of its return is identified with the theme,** borrowed from Holderlin, of the **"return of the Gods**". If one takes 'nihilism' to mean desacralization, **Capital, whose planetary reign is beyond any doubt—'technology' and 'Capital' being only paired off in an historic sequence but not in the concept—is certainly the only nihilistic potency of which men [and women] have succeeded in being the inventors as well as the prey.** Yet, for Marx, and for us, **desacralization is not in the least nihilistic, insofar as 'nihilism' must signify that which declares that the access to being and truth is impossible**. On the contrary**, desacralization is a necessary condition for the disclosing of such an approach to thought. It is obviously the only thing we can and must welcome within Capital: it exposes the pure multiple as the foundation of presentation; it denounces every effect of One as a simple, precarious configuration; it dismisses the symbolic representations in which the bond found a semblance of being.** That this destitution operates in the most complete barbarity must not conceal its properly ontological virtue. To whom must we be grateful to be delivered from the myth of Presence, the guarantee which it grants to the substantiality of the bonds and to the durability of essential relations, if not to the roaming automaticity of Capital? To think over and above Capital and its mediocre prescription (the general computation of time), **we must still have as a departure point what it has revealed: Being is essentially multiple, sacred Presence is a pure semblance and truth, as with anything if it exists**, is not a revelation, **much less so the proximity of that which withdraws itself. It is a regulated procedure resulting in a supplementary multiple. Our epoch is neither technical** (for it is so with mediocrity) **nor nihilistic** (for it is the first one that the destitution of sacred bonds lays open to the genericity of the true). **Its own enigma, against the grain of the nostalgic speculations of feudal socialism whose most complete emblem has certainly been Hitler, resides first in the local maintenance of the sacred which has been attempted**, but also denied, by the great poets since Holderlin. And, second, **in the anti-technological, archaistic reactions which continue to secure together under our very eyes the debris of religion** (from the soul supplement to Islamism), **messianic politics** (including Marxism), occult sciences (astrology, healing plants, telepathic massages, tickle and touch group therapy) **and all types of pseudo-bonds for which the syrupy love exalted in songs—loveless, truthless and encounterless love—constitutes the flaccid universal matrix.** Philosophy is not by any means complete. But **the stubbornness of these residues of the One's empire, which constitute anti-'nihilistic' nihilism, since they place themselves abeam to truth procedures and designate the recurrent obstacle opposed to subtractive ontology—Capital being its historic medium—leads us to think that philosophy has been in abeyance for a long time.** I shall put forth this paradox: **philosophy has not known until quite recently how to think in level terms with Capital, since it has left the field open, to its most intimate point, to vain nostalgia for the sacred, to obsession with Presence, to the obscure dominance of the poem, to doubt about its own legitimacy**. It has not known how to make thought out of the fact that man has become irreversibly 'master and possessor of nature' and that it is here neither a matter of loss nor of oblivion, but of its supreme destination—albeit featured, still, in the stupid opacity of computed time. Philosophy has left the 'Cartesian meditation' incomplete by going astray in the aestheticization of willing and the pathos of completion, the destiny of oblivion and the lost trace. It has not cared to recognize in a straightforward way the absoluteness of the multiple and the non-being of the bond. It has clung to language, to literature, to writing just as to the last possible representatives of an a priori determination of experience, or to the preserved place of a clearing of Being. It has declared since Nietzsche that what had begun with Plato was reaching its twilight, but this arrogant declaration concealed the powerlessness to continue this beginning. Philosophy **denounces or showers praise upon 'nihilistic modernity' only to the extent of the difficulty it has itself in grasping where current positivities pass in transit, and given its inability to conceive that we have blindly entered into a new phase of the doctrine of Truth, that of the multiple without-One, or of fragmentary, infinite and indiscernible totalities. 'Nihilism' is a least-worst signifier.**

#### Stoekl’s reading of Bataille fails to analyze the role of capitalism and results in depoliticization

Wernick 2009 (Andrew [Emeritus Professor of Cultural Studies and Sociology at Trent University]; Greened Bataille; Topia 21; kdf)

However, the book left me with some questions. Stoekl is masterly in weaving Bataille into whole cloth. But one is left to wonder about the twists, turns and torsions. For example, The Accursed Share (1988) itself can be seen as a pivot on which Bataille, until his later return to palaeo-anthropology, turned toward inner experience and the community of writers. Did the problematic change? Also, while Stoekl is undoubtedly correct to stress the importance of de Sade in the formation of Bataille’s thought, he downplays what was drawn from Freud and Nietzsche. These are minor points. A more substantive one is that in the conceptualization that Stoekl unfolds from Bataille, the bridge from ethics and religion to politics, at least in any strategic sense, is never really crossed. This is doubtless an inherent limitation—self-imposed— of a perspective that eschews utility on principle. But then, can there be a Bataillian politics? Stoekl would like to say yes, but what would it be? In plain terms: would such a politics point toward a reform movement within global capitalism (as history’s final point of arrival, pace late Kojeve); or toward one that would challenge capitalism itself? Stoekl’s disinclination to raise this archaic sounding question, and the wish to remain as much as possible on the plane of ethics, is understandable. But it parallels a tendency to blur the distinction between Bataille’s pre- and post-Second World War positions. Bataille blurred it himself in The Accursed Share, where his swerve toward inner experience and support for the Marshall Plan contrasts oddly with the more dangerous sentiments that still glow in the early chapters on general economy, expenditure and human sacrifice. A second point concerns religion. While Stoekl draws on Durkheim’s notion of the sacred to elucidate what Bataille had in mind in connection with practical heterology, he passes over the institutional side—its organization, its ritual, its articulation as a social fact—to focus mainly on the experiential and the philosophical (“atheological”). This follows the emphasis in Bataille’s own thought after 1945. But in the pre-war Collège de sociologie and Acéphale (with its secret collective) there had, nevertheless, been an institutional moment, albeit short-lived. Does its transitoriness, and unrepeatibility, signal the impossibility in principle of translating Bataille’s idea of (ir)religion into practice, or only the uniqueness of a conjuncture that brought this together with minoritarian revolutionary politics in a way that was bound to be evanescent? And what of the quite different turbulence, and different field of actors, that mark our own conjuncture? Given the post 9/11 growth of security and surveillance it is becoming hard to envisage any return to practical heterology (outside its nihilist reduction as terror). In any case: can it be a project at all? Are we not, with Bataille, in the zone of disorganized religion? Is the presencing of the sacred in the ecstasy of acephalic community itself to be chanelled and organized? Or is that sacred simply to be welcomed when it occurs, on whatever scale, out of the contradictory energy flows of the social? See for example Blanchot’s street scene description of May ‘68 in The Unavowable Community (1988: 29-33).

#### Their notion of the solar economy is flawed, collapsing the critique on itself

Baudrillard 98 , Jean (1998) “When Bataille Attacked the Metaphysical Principle of Economy” in Fred Botting and Scott Wilson (eds) Bataille: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 191-95. http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&ved=0CDcQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpreterhuman.net%2Ftexts%2Fpolitics%2FBaudrillard%2C%2520Jean\_When%2520Bataille%2520Attacked%2520the%2520Metaphysical%2520principle%2520of%2520Economy.rtf&ei=i\_tYUOaAH4bZqgHzkoDYAg&usg=AFQjCNFes8KOxqwWkB6ExN3S2gALSXcE9A&sig2=-cZCm65BZ5VNXU-TKLL7\_g

Bataille founds his general economy on a "solar economy" without reciprocal exchange, on the unilateral gift that the sun makes of its energy : a cosmogony of expenditure, which he deploys in a religious and political anthropology. But Bataille has misread Mauss: the unilateral gift does not exist. This is not the law of the universe. He who has so well explored the human sacrifice of the Aztecs should have known as they did that the sun gives nothing, it is necessary to nourish it continually with human blood in order that it shine. It is necessary to challenge [d6fier] the gods through sacrifice in order that they respond with profusion. In other words, the root of sacrifice and of general economy is never pure and simple expenditure-or whatever drive [pulsion] of excess that supposedly comes to us from nature-but is an incessant process of challenge Bataille has "naturalized" Mauss. The "excess of energy" does not come from the sun (from nature) but from a continual higher bidding in exchange-the symbolic process that can be found in the work of Mauss, not that of the gift (that is the naturalist mystique into which Bataille falls), but that of the counter-gift. This is the single truly symbolic process, which in fact implies death as a kind of maximal excess-but not as individual ecstasy, always as the maximal principle of social exchange. In this sense, one can reproach Bataille for having "naturalized" Mauss (but in a metaphysical spiral so prodigious that the reproach is not really one), and for having made symbolic exchange a kind of natural function of prodigality, at once hyper-religious in its gratuitousness and much too close still, a contrario, to the principle of utility and to the economic order that it exhausts in transgression without ever leaving behind.